Theories on the colonisation of Africa
Now that we understand the major technological factors that enabled the colonial conquest, and
how the process of partitioning unfolded, we can turn to the question of why Africa was colonised.
In the literature various, sometimes conflicting, explanations are offered. In the remainder of this
chapter we will discuss the most important theories, and evaluate their validity in the light of the
process of partitioning discussed above.
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The African dimension
The African Dimension theory focuses on the role of Africans in the partitioning of Africa. It
suggests that the European colonial conquest was provoked by two related phenomena. The first
was the abolition of the slave trade. This enforced a shift to legitimate trade, primarily of cash
crops. As a result, both exports and imports began to decline. The indigenous rulers that had
become rich through predatory activities such as the slave trade, adopted reactionary attitudes.
They started to resist increasing European influence. Their resistance, in turn, provoked European
reactions and ultimately hastened the actual military conquest.
The second phenomenon was that during the second half of the 19th century, instability increased
due to conflicts between those African elites that exercised informal European control, and the
African movements that opposed European incursion. Opposition movements used imported
weapons to fight the old elite. As these weapons became more widely available, more people
became involved in the struggle for power. Thus, local conflict and instability intensified. This
instability was not only bad for trade, but it also created a possible foothold for European rivals.
These developments also advanced European military conquest.
How well does this theory explain what happened during the partitioning of Africa? The
explanation focusing on opposition movements turning against the old elite originates from an
analysis of the Egyptian developments during the 1880s. Hence it fits that situation well. It can also
to some extent explain what happened in Tunisia and Zanzibar. Yet, it is only partially applicable
to Anglo-Boer relations in South Africa, and it cannot explain the battles between the Zulu and the
Xhosa and the British. Moreover, it cannot explain the French expansion in the Niger Sudan, as the
Muslim states usually went to great lengths to avoid war. Furthermore, the exploratory and treaty
signing activities employed by Leopold and de Brazza in the Congo basin do not fit this theory
well. Finally, the territory acquired by Italy in Somalia, and by Germany in West and East Africa
formed part of areas where the informal influence had actually been British, not German or Italian.
Political and strategic theories
Among the most powerful imperialist theories are the political and strategic explanations for the
partitioning. The start of the partitioning of Africa is often associated with how the balance of
power within Europe evolved during that period. Wars and rivalries between European nations had
brought the balance of power in Europe under pressure. Any actions by one European nation
required an immediate response from other countries to keep the balance. In order to preserve the
power and diplomatic balance at home, European powers felt that carving up the African continent
to settle conflicting interests in Africa was the only option. In this process, European did not form
one homogenous group, but instead acted often individually and focussed on their own self-interest
in Africa. The Portuguese, having had historic connections to Africa dating back to the 15th century,
felt the British ignored their ‘historic claim’ on Africa. In response, they started claiming control
over very extensive territories both on the west and east coast of the continent. Finally, Germany’s
chancellor, Bismarck was frustrated with British behaviour in Africa. The British policy at the time
was to exclude other powers from any political influence over territories, even when the British did
not occupy or had any legal claim themselves. Moreover, due to the intensifying competition
between France and Britain after the events in Egypt, Germany was worried it could lose out in
claiming territory in Africa. In response, Bismarck claimed territory in West Africa and at the same
time organised the Berlin Conference. Finally, even the British, whose dominance in the world had
started to decline during the 1880s, began to become deeply concerned about their national prestige
and credibility as a great power.
In addition to national prestige, personal prestige was also involved. European’s in Africa, as ‘men
on the spot’, sought to extend control, for their own esteem, to further their own career, or for the
prestige of the country they served. This often happened independently of the desires of the country
they served. It was especially relevant for the Niger and Sudan region where troops were staffed at
outposts that had survived from the slave trade era. Without clear missions and lacking regular
communication with their home country in Europe, these troops grew increasingly anxious and
restless. Combined with military supremacy, thus having the power to simply overtake neighbours,
it was tempting to annex alien societies across the frontier. In various cases, they started to conquer
land on their own. A well-known case is de Brazza’s exploring activities in the Congo Basin, which
he embarked upon on his own initiative. There were also ‘men-on-the-spot’ in the Gold Coast,
Senegal, and South Africa who worked on their own initiatives because they felt that the
governments at home were too slow or ignorant of what was happening on the ground. This
uncontrolled occupation of territory, which in some cases mounted to the occupation of significant
areas, is often cited as one of the triggers for competitive European annexation.
The need to protect strategic European interests was another factor driving the partitioning of
Africa. The global strategy view of imperialism argues that the partitioning of Africa originated
from proto-nationalist movements within Africa that were threatening European interests
elsewhere. In 1880, the British were not particularly interested in acquiring territory in Africa as
they were preoccupied with protecting the empire they already had in India. Thus, in 1882, they
engaged in military action to defend the Suez Canal, a key route towards India, from Egyptian
nationalists. However, this explanation seems too circumstantial to the two cases of Egypt and
South Africa, to be generally applicable to explain the grand partitioning of Africa.
The main criticism of this theory is that for European rivalries, prestige, and strategy to be
convincing explanations for the partitioning, there must have been something (economically)
valuable at stake. Why would European countries quarrel over land if there were nothing to be
gained from it in economic terms? Hence, the underlying notion in Europe during the run-up to the
partitioning was that there was at least some (potential) gain to be made.
Economic theory
The (potential) economic gain from acquiring colonies has indeed been very powerful in explaining
the rapid expansion of European countries into Africa after 1880. According to this theory of
imperialism, Europe needed Africa for new markets for selling their industrial products, for
obtaining raw materials for production and for investing their surplus capital (an argument often
associated with work of Hobson, and later Lenin).
During the 19th century Europe underwent rapid industrialisation. However, at the end of the
century Western Europe in particular found itself in a long depression, leading to decreased
consumption and overproduction. Instead of reducing production, industrialists looked for new
markets. In the same vein, the factories needed raw materials for production. And finally, European
capital owners were looking for a field for investment of surplus capital. For the first time, Africa
was considered an important factor for the development of European economies.
At this time, when Europe found itself in the depression described above, the reports of explorers
on the African continent that reached Europe never failed to emphasise the riches of the continent.
By the 1880s, the general belief in Europe was that Africa was ‘[…] the world’s last great untapped
reservoir of markets, resources and possible investment opportunities [.]’ (Sanderson 1985: 103).
Yet, Europe’s commercial interests in Africa were still mainly limited to certain areas in the West
coast. Actual trade between the continents represented only a fraction of the total trade for most
European countries. So it was the potential, rather than the actual gain, that made Africa so
attractive and motivated the partitioning.
Finally, the idea that there was a need to invest excess capital has lost its explanatory power during
recent decades as it is became clear that investments outside South Africa and Egypt were marginal.
The precise timing of the partitioning is thus hard to explain by theory. Why did the partitioning
not occur a few years earlier or later? For Britain, which was really the only industrialised power
in the 19th century, it would have been sufficient to maintain an informal empire in Africa. France
and Germany, which were only starting to industrialize in the late 19th century, had not experienced
significant problems in growth that needed to be solved by the establishment of an African empire.
And Portugal, a country with great colonial ambitions, was a pre-industrial power in the 1880s and
yet took control over very extensive territories in West and East Africa that, for long, remained a
heavy burden on the country’s underdeveloped economy.
Civilisation/Christianity
In many regions, formal colonisation of Africa was preceded by and to a large extent coincided
with the increase in missionary activities. It is sometimes suggested that the activities of the
missionaries were responsible for starting the partitioning of Africa. But although Christian
missionaries were often the first Europeans to enter a region, the eventual coloniser was often from
a different country than the missionaries. Only in a few cases is there a clear connection between
pre-colonial missionary activity and subsequent colonial occupation. In the case of the Buganda
kingdom, the British government was initially very reluctant to annex the kingdom. The costs were
considered too high. However, the missionaries demanded annexation because without formal
occupation they feared expulsion from the area where they had established themselves. The
missionaries won the bid for the public opinion and the British government, although not keen,
permitted the annexation of the Buganda Kingdom and its surrounding areas, which later would
become the Uganda Protectorate. In Nyasaland (now Malawi), again, the British government was
averse to occupying the area because the only convenient access to the sea was through Portuguese
Mozambique. Yet, the British government was afraid of becoming unpopular in Scotland, an
important region in the northern part of Great Britain, if they allowed the Scottish missionary
presence in the area be taken over by Portuguese Catholics. Thus, eventually the British occupied
the area.
Generally, the direct missionary influence on partitioning was limited. It has been argued, however,
that Christianity invoked a broader missionary and humanitarian impulse within European society
that aimed to enlighten and civilise the African peoples. Moreover, missionaries supported
colonialism out of the conviction that European control would facilitate missionary activity in
Africa. So while the missionaries probably did not actually cause the partitioning, their support for
colonialism certainly played a vital role in legitimising colonial occupation among Europeans.
To summarise, it seems that some explanations are applicable to certain regions and periods while
others seem more adequate for other cases. Together, the combination of all these motives seem be
exhaustive in explaining the partitioning of Africa. There is no agreement in the literature as to
which is the most important, although the combination of strategic/political and economic theories
seem to prevail. Together, these factors constituted a series of triggers. If one of the triggers had
not gone off, a combination of the others may well have sufficed to bring about the same result.
How the eventual partitioning evolved was the result of the interplay between European objectives
and actions, and African reactions and adaptation strategies.